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COURT REPORTS

satisfied certification under the CWA. However, the court observed
that overlap between state and federal permitting procedures did not
mean the state's jurisdictional reach turned on an interpretation of
the CWA. So long as the state's permitting program was at least as
stringent as the federal discharge elimination process, it could stand in
place of the federal regulations. Finding that it lacked jurisdiction
over the Board's action, the court reversed the ruling of the district
court and remanded the Board's enforcement action to the Virginia
state court.
Turning to the Corps' civil enforcement action premised on the
CWA, the court held that the Corps' jurisdiction depended on
whether the waters in question were "navigable," as contemplated by
A holding that such waters met the
the United States Code.
.navigable" definition would provide jurisdiction to the Corps
pursuant to section 404(a) of the CWA. The court determined that
waters contained by Newdunn's ditching efforts were navigable under
the CWA, because pollutants added to both the manmade and natural
waterways on the Newdunn property would inevitably find their way to
the waters Congress sought to protect. Thus, the Corps' jurisdiction
was proper.
For these reasons, the court remanded the Board's state
enforcement action to Virginia state court, and the Corps'
enforcement action to federal district court for further proceedings
not inconsistent with its opinion.
Curtis Graves

United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding (a) the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' tributary regulation fit comfortably
within Congress' authority to regulate navigable waters, (b) the Corps'
regulation of a roadside ditch under the Clean Water Act did not
exceed Congress' authority, and (3) the Corps' interpretation of its
own regulation was reasonable).
In 1989, the Deatons purchased a twelve-acre parcel ("Deaton
Parcel") on the Delmarva Peninsula, which separates the Chesapeake
Bay from the Atlantic Ocean. To make the Deaton Parcel suitable for
development into a small residential subdivision, the Deatons needed
to drain a large wetlands area in the middle of the property. The
Deatons hired a contractor in early 1990 who dug a drainage ditch
through the property. In the process of digging, the contractor
excavated dirt to either side of the drainage ditch in the wetlands area.
The drainage ditch flowed into a roadside ditch, which emptied into
the tributary system of the Chesapeake Bay.
In July 1990, the United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps")
became aware of the Deatons' ditch and initiated regulatory action.
After a series of unsuccessful negotiations, the United States filed a
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civil complaint alleging the Deatons violated the Clean Water Act
("CWA") by discharging fill material into a wetland without a permit.
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed
the complaint. The government appealed and on appeal, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case. On
remand, the Deatons asked the district court to reconsider the Corps'
jurisdiction in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers ("SWANCC"). In SWANCC, the Court held the Corps did
not have authority under the CWA to regulate an isolated, intrastate
water-filled gravel pit used by migratory birds. The district court
denied the motion and the Deatons appealed to the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals.
The Deatons first argued the CWA did not cover the roadside ditch
into which their ditch flowed. The Deatons argued this in two ways.
First, they claimed the Corps' interpretation of the CWA-through its
regulation granting CWAjurisdiction over the roadside ditch-pushed
the limits of Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause, and
subsequently raised a constitutional question the court should avoid.
Second, the Deatons claimed that even if Congress did authorize the
Corps to regulate the roadside ditch, such authorization exceeded the
limits of Congress' Commerce Clause power.
The court began with the question of Congress' authority over the
roadside ditch under the Commerce Clause. Comparing regulation of
the ditch to regulation of other channels of commerce, such as the
transportation of women for immoral purposes, the court concluded
Congress' authority to regulate waters to prevent their "immoral and
injurious use" was just as powerful as Congress' authority to regulate
highways and other channels of commerce. The court then reasoned
that Congress could regulate the roadside ditch, as a matter of water
quality, to prevent its use for injurious purposes. Having concluded
this, the court held the Corps' interpretation of the CWA to regulate
the roadside ditch did not approach the outer limits of Congress'
power, alter the federal-state framework, nor raise a serious
constitutional question.
Second, the Deatons argued the CWA did not cover the roadside
ditch because even if the CWA allowed the Corps to regulate nonnavigable tributaries of navigable waters, the roadside ditch did not
meet the definition of tributary in the Corps' regulations. The
Deatons also argued that if the ditch did meet the definition of
tributary in the Corps' regulations, the regulation was an unreasonable
interpretation of the CWA. The court disagreed with the Deatons on
both arguments, concluding that the Corps' interpretation of its
regulation to include the roadside ditch was not clearly erroneous
because it was a reasonable interpretation of the term "tributary." The
court then concluded the regulation was a reasonable interpretation
of the CWA because there was a significant nexus between a navigable
waterway, its non-navigable tributaries, and adjacent wetlands.
The Deatons also contested the Corps' choice of indicator for
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wetland hydrology in the area where the Deatons excavated the
drainage ditch dirt onto wetlands. The court dismissed this argument
by deferring to the Corps' use of visual observation in its
determination that water saturated the ground within twelve inches of
the surface.
Finally, the Deatons disputed the district court's remediation order
requiring them to fill in the drainage ditch. The Deatons argued the
CWA only regulated the deposit of excavated dirt into wetlands, not
the taking of dirt from them. The Deatons claimed the proper remedy
was to remove the dirt to a non-wetlands portion of the property. The
court found the district court did not abuse its discretion in the
remediation order because of the district court's findings that (1)
removing the excavated dirt to another part of the property would do
more environmental harm, and (2) requiring the Deatons to move the
dirt would allow the Deatons to benefit from the CWA violations.
Thus, the court sustained the remediation order.
JamesParrot

SIXTH CIRCUIT
United States v. City of Detroit, 329 F.3d 515 (6thCir. 2003) (holding:
(1) Administrative Procedure Act can waive sovereign immunity for
non-monetary claims even in cases brought under different statutes;
(2) consentjudgment between federal government and municipality
imposed obligations pursuant to law serving as basis for entry of
injunction under All Writs Act; (3) Administrative Procedure Act
provided jurisdiction for suit in absence of exceptional circumstances;
and (4) Corps decision requiring environmental assessment must be
reviewed under arbitrary and capricious standard).
Pursuant to a consent judgment between the City of Detroit
("Detroit") and the United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps"),
Detroit was obligated to dredge and dispose of sediment from Conner
Creek contaminated by discharges from the city's sewage treatment
facility. Detroit sought a declaratory judgment from the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan ordering the Corps
to accept dredge material from Conner Creek at a confined disposal
facility it was operating on behalf of the State of Michigan ("State").
The district court issued an injunction requiring the Corps to accept
the Connor Creek sediment to prevent frustration of the consent
judgment. The Corps appealed, and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the district court's order and
issued an unpublished opinion that the district court both lacked the
authority and abused its discretion in issuing the injunction. Detroit
then filed a petition for rehearing. The court granted the petition,
reheard the case, held the district court had the authority to bind the

